DNS Lookup
Decode the full DNS answer and check or generate RFC 10023 _for-sale records.
DNS SecurityMost DNS changes that go wrong were planned against a summary: a value without its response code, an alias nobody noticed, a TTL read from the zone file instead of the cache. Read the whole answer first — status, owner, path, lifetime, and source — and the right change usually becomes obvious.
A DNS response carries a response code before it carries records, and the two common negative answers mean different things. NXDOMAIN says the name does not exist at all. NODATA — NOERROR with an empty answer — says the name exists but owns no record of the requested type: www.example.com may have an A record and no AAAA, or _dmarc.example.com may exist only because something lives below it. Both are real answers that resolvers cache (RFC 2308). SERVFAIL, REFUSED, and a timeout are not answers. They prove nothing about whether the record exists, and treating them as “missing” is how teams end up re-creating records that were never gone.
The DNS Lookup keeps these states apart because it decodes the DNS message itself rather than a summary of it: response code, header flags, every record in readable and zone-file form, and any Extended DNS Error (RFC 8914) the resolver attached. An Extended DNS Error is often the fastest pointer you get. A DNSSEC code on a SERVFAIL sends you straight to the signature chain — the path described in Diagnosing DNSSEC Outages — while a blocked, censored, or filtered code means a resolver policy made the decision, not your zone.
When a name is an alias, the resolver returns the CNAME chain followed by the records of its final target. Every record after the chain belongs to that target's owner name, with the target zone's TTLs and the target operator's change schedule. That matters whenever you debug “our” record: the address you see for shop.example.com may be a CDN address that changes hourly. A CNAME also excludes other data at the same name (RFC 2181 Section 10.1), which is why a zone apex — it must carry SOA and NS — cannot be a CNAME, and why DNS providers offer apex flattening and HTTPS records offer AliasMode instead.
A DNAME redirects a whole subtree, and resolvers then synthesize a CNAME for the queried name (RFC 6672) that looks like a record nobody wrote. The lookup marks synthesized aliases and alias loops explicitly. When the chain itself is the problem — a dangling CNAME to a deprovisioned service, or a target that answers NODATA — fix it at the owner of the link that breaks, not at the name the user typed.
A recursive resolver hands out its cached copy and counts the TTL down from the moment it fetched the record. The configured value appears only right after a cache miss, so two lookups seconds apart can show different numbers, and a low number does not mean someone lowered it. Read the remaining TTL for what it is: the latest moment this resolver will ask again. The value configured in your zone is what your name servers return directly, and that is what the DNS Delegation & Nameserver Health check queries.
Plan changes around both directions of caching. Lowering a TTL only helps once the old, longer TTL has expired everywhere, so lower it at least one old TTL ahead of the change. Negative answers are cached too: their lifetime is the smaller of the SOA record's own TTL and its MINIMUM field (RFC 2308), so a record added minutes after someone looked for it can stay invisible to that resolver for that long. And keep one TTL per RRset; differing TTLs within a set are deprecated because caches then return partial sets (RFC 2181 Section 5.2).
A TXT record is a sequence of character-strings of at most 255 octets each, not one free-form value. Long DKIM keys and SPF policies are therefore split, and whether the split matters depends on the protocol that reads the record. SPF treats several strings in one record as concatenated without spaces (RFC 7208 Section 3.3), while two separate v=spf1 records are an error. RFC 10023 goes the other way and requires every _for-sale record to be exactly one string. Many tools print presentation format that hides or re-quotes these boundaries; the DNS Lookup shows a character-string table per record and renders control and bidirectional characters as visible escape markers instead of interpreting them.
Before editing a TXT record, compare the strings, not the joined text. Zone editors that split long values automatically and web panels that join them can each turn a valid record into an invalid one without any visible change in the interface.
RFC 10023, published in July 2026 as an Informational RFC, defines a simple way to say that a registered domain is available for purchase: TXT records at the reserved leaf name _for-sale directly under the domain. Each record starts with the case-sensitive version tag v=FORSALE1; and may carry exactly one content tag: fval= for an indicative asking price such as EUR999, furi= for exactly one URI (http, https, mailto, and tel are recommended), ftxt= for short human-readable text, or fcod= for a code that only a cooperating registry or broker interprets. One RRset may hold several such records, each with one pair, and no pair may appear twice.
_for-sale.example.com. 3600 IN TXT "v=FORSALE1;fval=EUR999"
_for-sale.example.com. 3600 IN TXT "v=FORSALE1;furi=https://example.com/contact"
The rules that catch real records are mostly structural. Each record must be a single character-string of at most 255 octets, and content values are limited to 239 octets. A record without the version tag is never an indicator, and if no record carries it, processors must ignore the name entirely; a valid version tag with missing or unrecognized content still signals “for sale”. _for-sale must be the leftmost label, records under .arpa must be ignored, and text claiming the domain is not for sale is invalid content — remove the records when the sale is over instead. Keep the TTL at or below the recommended 3600 seconds so prices and availability do not linger in caches.
Reading such a record is a trust exercise. A wildcard or an alias can produce a _for-sale answer the domain holder never intended, prices are indicative only, and RFC 10023 forbids processors to follow a furi without explicit user confirmation. The DNS Lookup's _for-sale section therefore queries exactly that owner name, validates every record against the RFC with its string boundaries intact, flags answers that arrived through an alias and, where DNSSEC signatures allow it, wildcard synthesis, shows URIs as text without opening them, and adds the price disclaimer. Its generator drafts records escaped for a zone file. Before publishing, take the RFC's privacy section seriously: everything in the record, including an email address or phone number in furi, is public and easy to scrape.
Every answer in this workflow comes from one recursive resolver at one moment: Cloudflare over DNS-over-HTTPS from your browser, or the same resolver through the site's same-origin helper when the browser path fails. That is the view many users get, but it is a cache, shaped by that resolver's policy. The AD flag means the resolver reports that it validated DNSSEC; it is not an independent validation, and the DNSSEC Validator shows the chain evidence behind it. When the question is what your own name servers serve — after a provider change, or when some resolvers fail while others answer — move from the recursive view to the authoritative one; the delegation guide walks through that step.